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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter 
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2a-3(2)(d) (1937). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final circuit court 
judgment, convicting the defendant/appellant, David A. 
Bean (hereinafter referred to as Mr. Bean) of driving 
under the influence of alcohol, open container in a 
vehicle while driving, and false information to a law 
enforcement officer. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Is a person, sitting behind the steering wheel and 
attempting to start an inoperable car, parked off the 
roadway, in actual physical control of the vehicle within 
the meaning of Sandy City Ordinance Art. 6-119 (41-6-44) 
when another person was in control of the vehicle when it 
came to rest. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final circuit court 
judgment, convicting Mr. Bean of driving under the 
influence of alcohol, open container in a vehicle while 
-1-
driving, and giving false information to a law enforcement 
officer. This case was tried before Judge Robin W. Reese 
in the Third Circuit Court, State of Utah, Salt Lake 
County, Sendy Department,, The guilty verdict was entered 
by way of Memorandum Decision on the 9th day of June, 
1988, and the Notice of Appeal was filed on the 30th day 
of July, 1988. A formal Judgment and Sentence was signed 
by the Court subsequently on August 12, 1988. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the evening of November 2, 1985, the defendant, 
(hereinafter referred to as "Bean") and his brother, 
Michael, went to a tavern in Sandy, Utah, in Bean's wife's 
car, They drank beer until it was late. (T at 35). Both 
Bean and Michael testified that when they left the tavern, 
Micheal was in better condition to drive than Bean, so 
Michael drove the vehicle from the tavern toward his home. 
(T at 35, 36, 40, & 43). As Michael was driving up 8600 
South Street, the engine of the car stalled and Michael 
coasted the vehicle off the roadway. (T at 36). After 
trying unsuccessfully to restart the car, Michael left the 
keys in the car and began walking back down 8600 South 
Street toward a friend's house where he attempted to call 
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for assistance, (T at 36, 37, & 43). 
While on patrol at about midnight, Officer Cravens 
observed the Bean vehicle on the shoulder of the road. 
(T at 4 - 6). Officer Cravens approached from the rear 
and saw Bean alone in the car behind the wheel in the driver's 
seat. (T at 6 - 7 & 28). The Officer observed that the 
keys to the vehicle were in the ignition and that Bean was 
trying to start the engine as he approached. (T at 7). 
Officer Cravens asked Bean why he was there. Bean 
answered that he was having car trouble and told the 
officer to "smell the carta" (T at 9 - 10). 
Field sobriety tests were conducted at the scene and 
based upon the results, the Officer concluded that Bean 
was under the influence of alcohol and arrested him. (T 
at 14 & 21). Officer Cravens recalls that Michael 
approached and conversed with him as he was placing Bean 
in the police car. The officer does not remember the 
substance of the conversation. (T at 30, 31 & 33). 
Michael testified that after observing the lights of the 
stopped police car, he approached the Officers and, upon 
learning that they were arresting Bean, told them that he had 
been driving the car, not Bean. (T at 37). The vehicle 
-3-
was impounded and Bean subsequently submitted to an 
intoxilyzer test, which resulted in a reading of .23. (T 
at 37 - 38; Prosecution Exhibits #2 & #3). When Bean and 
Michael later went to pick up the vehicle at the impound 
lot, they were unable to get it started until they put 
gasoline in the gas tank. (T at 38 - 39). 
Based upon the evidence, the Court concluded that 
"accepting as true the defendant's claim that his 
brother drove the vehicle to the place where the officer 
first observed it", the defendant was nevertheless in 
actual physical control of the vehicle within the meaning 
of the statute. (Memorandum Decision, Page 2) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
"Actual physical control" requires more than the mere 
presence of an intoxicated person in a vehicle. At a very 
minimum, there should be evidence beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the person arrested either operated the vehicle 
or was capable of operating the vehicle. 
The concept of control is that the controller is 
capable of making the object under control respond to 
commands. In this case, the evidence shows that this was 
not the case with Bean. He did not drive the vehicle to 
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the place where the police found him and was not capable 
of moving the car from the position it was in, because it 
was out of gas. Under the circumstances, he was not in 
"actual physical control" of the vehicle. 
ARGUMENT 
I. MR. BEAN WAS NOT IN "ACTUAL PHYSICAL 
CONTROL" OF THE VEHICLE. 
The issue before this Court involves the question of 
what constitutes actual physical control for the purposes 
of Sandy City Ordinance Art. 6-119(1). In Garcia v. 
Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651 (Utah 1982), a case similar to 
this case, the Utah Supreme Court had occasion to discuss 
in some detail the meaning of "actual physical control". 
In Garcia, plaintiff was appealing the revocation of his 
driver license for refusing to submit to chemical tests of 
his blood and breath. Plaintiff had been found by police 
at an apartment complex in his vehicle attempting to start 
it. However, a witness had positioned his own car behind 
plaintiff's car to keep plaintiff from backing out of the 
Sandy City Ordinance Art. 6-119(1) is the same as 
U.C.A. §41-6-44(1) 
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stall. Plaintiff's forward progression was barred by a 
fence. Plaintiff claimed he was not in "actual physical 
control" of the vehicle where it was not started and could 
not be moved more chan a few feet. 
The court held that plaintiff s conduct put plaintiff 
in control of the vehicle. _ld. at 654, 655. In so 
holding, the court found that the purpose of the "actual 
physical control" language was to place in the DUI statute 
two offenses: 1) operating a vehicle under the influence 
of alcohol, and 2) being in control of the vehicle. Id. 
at 653. The court found that the policy behind the latter 
of these offenses was that persons sitting behind the 
wheel of a vehicle pose a threat to the public. _Id. at 
654. The court quoted with approval from City of 
Cincinnati v. Kelley, 351 N.E,2d 85,87 (Ohio 1976): 
The clear purpose of the 
control aspect of the instant 
ordinance is to deter persons from 
being found under circumstances in 
which they can directly commence 
operating a vehicle while they are 
under the influence of alcohol. . . 
The term "actual physical control," 
as employed in the subject ordinance, 
requires that a person be in the 
driver's seat of a vehicle, behind the 
steering wheel, in possession of the 
ignition key, and in such condition 
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that he is physically capable of 
starting the engine and causing the 
vehicle to move. 
Garcia, supra at 654. 
In Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778 (Utah 1986), 
the court further explained the type of conduct that the 
"actual physical control" language is aimed at. In Lopez, 
the plaintiff was appealing the revocation of his license 
for failure to consent to take a breath test. Plaintiff 
was found sitting in the driver's seat, slumped over the 
steering wheel. The vehicle was pulled alongside a phone 
booth and tracks in the fresh snow showed that it had just 
recently pulled into that position. Plaintiff claimed 
that the vehicle was inoperable and that this, along with 
the fact that he was not operating the vehicle, rendered 
the revocation of his license improper. In holding 
that plaintiff was in control of the vehicle, the court 
quoted from State v. Smelter, 674 P.2d 690, 693 (Wash.App. 
1984) : 
The focus should not be narrowly 
upon the mechanical condition of the 
car when it comes to rest, but upon 
the status of its occupant and the 
nature of the authority he or she 
exerted over the vehicle in arriving 
at the place from which, by virtue of 
its inoperability, it can no longer 
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move. Where, as here, circumstantial 
evidence permits a legitimate 
inference that the car was where it 
was and was performing as it was 
because of the defendant's choice, it 
follows that the defendant was in 
actual physical contrrl. 
Lopaz, supra at 781. 
The decisions of the Utah Supreme Court in Garcia and 
Lopez indicate that the "actual physical control" 
provisions of the DUI statute is to get at persons who, 
while not operating a vehicle when arrested, either had 
been or were going to operate the vehicle in which the 
persons were found. The importance of this is that while 
both Garcia and Lopez upheld the revocation of the 
plaintiffs1 licenses, the language of both cases indicates 
that there may be circumstances where even though a person 
under the influence is in the driver's seat cf a vehicle, 
that person is not in "actual physical control" of the 
vehicle. 
For instance, the language quoted from Lopez takes 
into account the circumstances by which the vehicle got to 
the place where police arrested the plaintiff. Similarly, 
Garcia focused on the ability or apparent ability to 
operate the vehicle. In this case, the evidence accepted 
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by the court below shows that Mr. Bean's brother drove the 
vehicle to the place where Mr. Bean was arrested. 
Likewise, at the time Mr. Bean was arrested, the vehicle 
was incapable of operation, due to lack of fuel. Given 
the facts, Mr. Bean's conviction serves no useful 
purpose. 
Mr. Bean did not operate the vehicle nor was there 
anything he could have done to operate the vehicle. This 
being the case, the vehicle was not under his control. 
This position is consistent with the language of both 
Garcia and Lopez. 
In Key v. Town of Kinsey, 424 So.2d 701 (Ala.App. 
1982), the court was faced with a similar situation. In 
that case, the defendant was in a car that had run out of 
gas. His son had taken the keys and walked to get gas. 
The court, in holding in favor of the defendant, noted 
that the vehicle was not operable by reason of its being 
out of gas and because the son had taken the keys. Jd. at 
703,704. Key can arguably be distinguished from this case 
in that Mr. Bean's brother left the keys in the car. 
However, this distinction seems to be inconsequential. 
Mr. Bean was no more capable of driving the car because 
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the keys were in the ignition, that if they had been taken 
out, because the vehicle was out of gas. 
As noted by the Utah Supreme Court in Lopez, an 
important factor is the nature of the control an 
individual has over a vehicle. Mr. Bean was no more than 
an occupant of the vehicle under the circumstances of this 
case, and any control that he had over the vehicle was not 
sufficient to arise to a level of "actual physical 
control", for the purpose of Sandy City Ordinance Art. 
6-119. 
A final point that supports the reversal of Mr. 
Bean's conviction is that both Lopez and Garcia dealt with 
administrative actions to revoke the plaintiffs1 licenses. 
The court noted in Garcia, supra: 
Actions to revoke a license under 
UCA §41-6-44.10(b) are "quasi civil 
and administrative" and require only 
the support of a preponderance of the 
evidence, while prosecutions under 
criminal statutes require proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 1^ 3. at 652. 
In this case, burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt was not satisfied. As was noted in Key, supra, 
"...Any act of control requires an object (here, the 
automobile) that is subject to that control." Id. at 704. 
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The car in which Mr. Bean was sitting had not been under 
his control while his brother was driving it. Therefore, 
the fact that his brother left the car to get gas should 
not place Mr. Bean in control of a vehicle which was 
immobile, for the purpose of Sandy City Ordinance 
Art. 6-119. 
In Lopez, supra, the Utah Supreme Court held that the 
purpose of allowing the arrest of a person in "actual 
physical control" of a vehicle, is to protect the public 
and apprehend drunken drivers before they strike. J[d- a^ 
781. However, in this case, this purpose does not present 
sufficient justification to convict Mr. Bean, where under 
the circumstances the car he was in was totally disabled. 
CONCLUSION 
The policy behind the law prohibiting a person with a 
blood alcohol level of .08% or greater from being in 
"actual physical control" of a vehicle is to deter drivers 
from operating their vehicles while under the influence. 
It may be reasonable to assume that when a car is found to 
the side of the road with the keys in the ignition and 
someone sitting alone in the car behind the wheel, that 
the car is where it is because of the actions of that 
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person. However, where that person presents credible 
evidence that would contradict the assumption, then a 
valid defense is created under the language of Lopez. Mr. 
Bean has adequately contradicted such an assumption and 
therefore, requests this Court reverse the decision of the 
Court below and dismiss this action against him. 
DATED this £% day of December, 1988. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
<?yuo^ te s)i\ 
DONALD E. KUNZ 
COOK & WILDE, P.C. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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9/22/91 ivis (Munty, State of Utah 
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ADDENDUM NO. 1 
Article 6 
QUALIFICATIONS OF DRIVERS AND DUI 
Sections: 
Sec. 119 Users of drugs and intoxicants (DUI). 1 
Sec. 120 Standards for chemical breath analysis -
Evidence. 4 
Sec. 121 Chemical tests as evidence. 5 
Sec. 122 Authority to prosecute violations - Driving 
on suspension or revocation. 5 
Sec. 123 Implied consent - refusal - revocation of 
license - person incapable of refusal. 5 
Sec. 124 Drinking in vehicle, open container. 7 
Sec. 125 Impoundment of vehicles. 8 
Sec. 126 Intoxicated pedestrian 9 
Sec. 127 Permitting use by habitual user. 9 
Sec. 128 Intoxicated person in or about a vehicle. 9 
Sec. 129 Incapable operators. 9 
Sec. 130 Permitting incapable operators to operate. 9 
Sec. 131 Incompetent operators. 9 
Sec. 132 Permitting incompetent operator to operate. 10 
Sec, 133 Operator's license 10 
Sec. 134 No Fault Insurance 12 
Sec. 134.5 Vehicle accidents - reports and 
investigation of driver security 12 
sect II? Users of drugs and Intoxicants (PUIh 
41-6-44 
(1) (a) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in 
this section for any person to operate or be in actual 
physical control of a vehicle within this city if the person 
has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or 
greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours 
after the alleged operation or physical control, or if the 
person is under the influence of alcohol or any drug or the 
combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which 
renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating 
this section is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol 
or a drug is not a defense against any charge of violating 
this section. 
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based 
upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood and 
alcohol concentration in the breath shall be based upon 
grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
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(3) (a) Every person who is convicted the first time 
of a violation of subsection (1) is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. But if the person has inflicted a bodily 
injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated 
the vehicle in a negligent manner, he is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence 
is that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that 
degree of care which an ordinarily reasonable and prudent 
persons exercise under like or similar circumstances. 
(4) In addition to any penalties imposed under 
subsection (3), the court shall, upon a first conviction, 
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 
consecutive hours nor more than 240 hours, with emphasis on 
serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person 
to work in a community-rservice work program for not less 
than 24 hours nor more than 50 hours and, in addition to the 
jail sentence or the work in the community service work 
program, order the person to participate in an assessment 
and educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation 
facility. 
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction within five years 
after a first conviction under this section the court shall, 
in addition to any penalties imposed under subsection (3), 
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 
consecutive hours nor more than 720 hours with emphasis on 
serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person 
to work in a community-service work program for not less 
than 80 hours nor more than 240 hours and, in addition to 
the jail sentence or the work in the community-service work 
program, order the person to participate in an assessment 
and educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation 
facility. The court may, in its discretion order the person 
to obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility. 
(b) Upon a subsequent conviction within five 
years after a second conviction under this section the court 
shall, in addition to any penalties imposed under subsection 
(3), impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 
nor more than 2,160 hours with emphasis on serving in the 
drunk tank of the jail or require the person to work in the 
community-service work program for not less than 240 nor 
more than 720 hours and, in addition to the jail sentence or 
word in the community-service work program, order the person 
to obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility. 
(c) No portion of any sentence imposed under 
subsection (3) may be suspended and the convicted person is 
not eligible for parole or probation until any sentence 
imposed under this section has been served. Probation or 
parole resulting from a conviction for a violation of this 
section may not be terminated and the department may not 
reinstate any license suspended or revoked as a result of 
the conviction, if it is a second or subsequent conviction 
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within five years, until the convicted person has furnished 
evidence satisfactory to the department that all fines and 
fees, including fees for restitution, and rehabilitation 
costs, assessed against the person, have been paid. 
(6) (a) The provisions in subsections (4) and (5) 
that require a sentencing court to order a convicted person 
to: participate in an assessment and educational series at a 
licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility; obtain, in the 
discretion of the court, treatment at an alcohol 
rehabilitation facility; or obtain, mandatorily, treatment 
at an alcohol rehabilitation facility; or do any combination 
of those things, apply to a conviction for a violation of 
section 41-6-45 UCA or section 242 of this code that 
qualifies as a prior offense under subsection (7). The 
court is required to render the same order regarding 
education or treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation 
facility, or both, in connection with a first, second, or 
subsequent conviction under section 242 that qualifies as a 
prior offense under subsection (7), as the court would 
render in connection with applying respectively, the first, 
second, or subsequent conviction requirements of subsections 
119 (4) and (5). 
(b) For purposes of determining whether a 
conviction under section 242 which qualified as a prior 
conviction under subsection (7), is a first, second, or 
subsequent conviction under this subsection, a previous 
conviction under either this section or section 242 is 
considered a prior conviction. 
(c) Any alcohol rehabilitation program and any 
community-based or other education program provided for in 
this section shall be approved by the department of social 
services. 
(7) (a) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of 
guilty or no contest to a charge of a violation of section 
242 the prosecution shall state for the record a factual 
basis for the plea, including whether or not there had been 
consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, 
by the defendant in connection with the offense. The 
statement is an offer of proof of the facts which shows 
whether there was consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a 
combination of both, by the defendant, in connection with 
the offense. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before 
accepting the plea offered under this subsection of the 
consequences of a violation of section 242 as follows: If 
the court accepts the defendant's plea of guilty or no 
contest to a charge of violation section 242, and the 
prosecutor states for the record that there was consumption 
of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the 
defendant in connection with the offense, the resulting 
conviction is a prior offense for the purposes of subsection 
(5). 
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(c) The court shall notify the department of each 
conviction of Section 242 which is a prior offense for the 
purposes of Subsection (5). 
(8) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a 
person for a violation of this section when the officer has 
probable cause to believe the violation has occurred, 
although not in his presence, and if the officer has 
probable cause to believe that the violation was committed 
by the person. 
(9) The department of public safety shall suspend for 
a period of 90 days the operator's license of any person 
convicted for the first time under subsection (1), and shall 
revoke for one year the license of any person otherwise 
convicted under this section, except that the department may 
subtract from any suspension period the number of days for 
which a license was previously suspended under section 41-2-
130 UCA if the previous suspension was based on the same 
occurrence upon which the record of conviction is based 
upon. 
(10) This section 119, was enacted to be in harmony 
with and in substance the same as Section 41-6-44, UCA. 
Sec. 120 Standards for chemical breath analysis z. 
Evidence. 41-6-44.3 
(1) The commissioner of the Department of public 
safety, for the State of Utah, shall establish standards for 
the administration and interpretation of chemical analysis 
of a person's breath, including standards of training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is 
material to prove that a person was operating or in actual 
physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol or any drug or operating with a blood or breath 
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, documents offered as 
memoranda or records of acts, conditions or events to prove 
that the analysis was made and the instrument used was 
accurate, according to standards established in subsection 
(1), are admissible if: 
(a) The judge finds that they were made in the 
regular course of the investigation at or about the time of 
the act, condition or event; and 
(b) The source of information from which made and 
the method and circumstances of their preparation indicate 
their trustworthiness. 
(c) If the judge finds that the standards 
established under subsection (1) and the conditions of 
subsection (2) have been met, there is a presumption that 
the test results are valid and further foundation for 
introduction of the evidence is unnecessary. 
(3) This section 120, was enacted to be in harmony 
with and in substance the same as Section 41-6-44.3, UCA. 
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THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 




DAVID A. BEAN, 
Defendant. 
> MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) CASE NO. 851000520 TC 
The above case was heard at a regularly scheduled 
trial on the 3rd day of June, 1988. 
FINDING OF FACT 
The court finds the following to have been 
established: 
On November 2, 1985, the defednant, David A. Bean, 
was observed by a Sandy City police officer sitting behind 
the steering wheel of a motor vehicle, attempting to start 
the same. The defendant was never observed in the 
passenger side of the vehicle, and when the officer 
approached the vehicle, the defendant said he was having 
car trouble and told the officer to "smell the carb1.11 
The only direct evidence on the issue of who had 
driven the vehicle to the spot where the defendant was 
observed trying to start it was provided by the defendant 
and his brother, Michael Bean. At trial, each testified 
that Michael Bean had been driving the vehicle. 
ISSUE 
The issue which is the subject of this memorandum 
decision is: Was the defendant in actual physical control 
of the vehicle? 
CONCLUSION 
Accepting as true the defendant's claim that his 
brother drove the vehicle to the place where the officer 
first observed it, the court finds that the defendant was 
in actual physical control. 
The defendant points to language in the Utah case 
of Lopez v. Schwendiman, P.2d 778 (Utah, 1986) which the 
defendant contends would allow a finding of actual 
physical control in a case where the vehicle in question 
is disabled, only if there is evidence that the vehicle is 
where it is because of the actions of the defendant. In 
this case, that would mean that the court, to convict the 
defendant, would have to find that he drove the vehicle to 
the place where the officer observed it. 
This construation of the Lopez case however does 
not comport with the holding of another Utah case, Garcia 
v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651 (Utah, 1982). In that case, 
the court said:...,fWe believe that the 'actual physical 
control' language of Utah's implied consent statute should 
be read as intending to prevent intoxicated drivers from 
entering their vehicles except as passengers or passive 
occupants..." 
This would seem to be true even where the driver's 
vehicle was inoperable. In this case, the court finds 
that the defendant was not just a passive occupant or 
passenger. The fact that the defendant did not drive the 
vehicle to the place where the officer observed it is not 
determinative. 
THEREFORE, the court finds the defendant guilty of 
the charge in count I, and counts II and III as well. 
DATED this 9th day of June, 1988./^ 
ROBIN W. REESE 
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision to Nicholas J. 
Angelides at 6925 Union Park Center, Suite 490, Midvale, 
Utah 84047 and delivered a true and correct copy of the 
same to Van Midgley, Sandy City Attorney, at 440 East 8680 
South, Sandy, Utah 84070. 
DATED this 9th day of June, 1988. 
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